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The Volcker Rule: Clarifying the Anti-Evasion 
Provision to Facilitate Compliance 
I. INTRODUCTION
The long-awaited Volcker Rule (“Rule”)1 was fully implemented 
on July 21, 2015, five years after being introduced.2  As part of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”),3 which added § 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC 
Act”) of 1956,4 the Rule prohibits covered banking entities5 from 
engaging in proprietary trading or investing in covered funds.6  The 
trading prohibition applies to short-term trading, which is generally 
considered as holding a financial instrument for less than sixty days.7  The 
final version of the Rule was released and adopted on April 1, 2014 by 
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351 (2015); 17 C.F.R. §§ 75, 255 (2015). 
2. Daniel Roberts, Volcker Rule Takes Effect Today After Years Of Delay, FORTUNE
(July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/volcker-rule/. 
3. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
4. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”), H.R. 6227, 84th Cong. (1956).
5. See BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, FINAL VOLCKER RULE REGULATIONS: RESTRICTIONS
ON COVERED FUND ACTIVITIES AND INVESTMENT 3–4 (Jan. 6, 2014) (defining banking entities 
as “any insured depository institution; any company that controls an insured depository 
institution; any company treated as a bank holding company for purposes of § 8 of the 
International Banking Act of 1978; and any affiliate or subsidiary of any of the foregoing 
institutions”). 
6. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851; 17 C.F.R. § 75 (defining proprietary trading as
“engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity in any purchase or sale 
of one or more financial instruments”); see also ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY:
VOLCKER RULE-FINAL IMPLEMENTING RULES 3 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ADV214VolckerRuleFinalImplementing
Rules.pdf (defining covered funds as “privately offered funds or pools that either (i) rely on 
Section 39(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act for an exemption from that Act 
[or] (ii) are commodity pools offered privately in reliance on exemptions in CFTC Rule 
4.7 . . . .”). 
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 75 (2015) (noting the rebuttable presumption that any purchases or
sales of a financial instrument are considered for a short-term trading account if they are held 
for less than 60 days); Hillel T. Cohn, The Volcker Rule Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading: 
Considerations for Broker-Dealer Affiliates of Foreign Banking Organizations, THE COLUM.
L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG, (Feb. 3, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/02/03/the-
volcker-rule-prohibitions-on-proprietary-trading-considerations-for-broker-dealer-affiliates-
of-foreign-banking-organizations/.
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the five agencies (“Regulators”) charged with implementing the Rule 
(“Final Implementing Rules”): the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).8  Though the Rule went into effect April 1, 2014, 
covered banking entities had until July 21, 2015 (“Compliance Date”), to 
fully conform their proprietary trading activities and investments to the 
Rule’s requirements.9  However, banking entities have until July 21, 
2016, to conform any investments in covered funds and foreign funds that 
were in place prior to December 31, 2013.10 
Although the Rule bans proprietary trading, it also carves out 
limited exceptions for certain purposes (“Permitted Activities”).11  The 
Rule and the Final Implementing Rules permit proprietary trading in 
conjunction with the following activities: underwriting, market making, 
risk-mitigating hedging, trading in domestic government debt, trading on 
behalf of customers, and trading by insurance companies.12  These 
Permitted Activities do not give banking entities free rein; rather the 
Permitted Activities are subject to a set of overriding limitations, 
collectively known as the “Prudential Backstops.”13  The Prudential 
8. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i); 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351, 255
(2015); Arnold & Porter LLP, supra note 6. 
9. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 1.
10. FRANK A. MAYER, III ET AL., PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, CLIENT ALERT: OBSERVATION
2.0: THE ANTI-EVASION PROVISION OF THE VOLCKER RULE 1 (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert010815.pdf. 
11. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2012) (listing the generally permitted
activities); see also Final Rule § ___.3, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014) (stating 
that a banking entity may not engage as principal in: (1) any purchase or sale of one or more 
“financial instruments” (2) for the “trading account” of the banking entity, (3) unless: the 
activity is excluded from the definition of “proprietary trading,” or an exemption is available 
and its requirements are satisfied) (the text of the Final Rule, which contains the provisions 
common to all five Regulators, and its accompanying attachments may be found at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/final-common-rules-
20131210.pdf). 
12. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (2012) (highlighting all permitted
activities and noting that “insurance company” includes those “directly engaged in the 
business of insurance for the general account of the company” as well as “any affiliate of such 
regulated insurance company”); DANIEL L. GOELZER, BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIENT ALERT:
THE VOLCKER RULE—COMPLIANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN BANKING 
ENTITIES (Apr. 2014), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/27b69c86-beb1-
4319-ab19-537caeb84a7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5bd77889-b44d-4c13-9a4d-
58f27ee56697/al_bf_proprietarytradingprohibition_jan14.pdf). 
13. See Final Rule § ____.7(a), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014) (laying out
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Backstops indicate that proprietary trading activities that would 
otherwise be permissible—or, fall within an aforementioned exception—
are not appropriate where they would result in “a material conflict of 
interest” or “a material exposure . . . to a high-risk asset or high-risk 
trading strategy.”14  Activities are also inappropriate where they would 
pose a threat either to the “safety and soundness” of a banking entity or 
to the “financial stability of the United States.”15 
The Prudential Backstops are not insurmountable—banking 
entities can overcome these “conflict[s] of interest” by making timely 
disclosures to the client prior to engaging in any transactions that may 
produce a conflict of interest, or by using information barriers that are 
addressed in their written policies.16  A timely disclosure would need to 
provide the client with sufficient time to “evaluate and act on the 
information.”17  Information barriers could include actual separation of 
“personnel or functions,” or certain limitations on types of activity 
permitted.18  Despite these mitigating measures, the Prudential Backstops 
pose a potential problem given the high-level of subjectivity involved in 
determining whether an activity may cause a material conflict of interest, 
or, whether it rises to a sufficient level to be considered a threat either to 
the safety and soundness of the banking entity or, to the financial stability 
of the United States.19 
the limitations on permitted proprietary trading exceptions to the Rule); see also SULLIVAN & 
CROMWELL LLP, U.S. AGENCIES APPROVE FINAL VOLCKER RULE, DETAILING PROHIBITIONS
AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO BANKING ENTITIES WORLDWIDE 118 (Jan. 27, 
2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule.pdf 
(noting that these overriding limitations are referred to by Regulators as “prudential 
backstops”). 
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 619, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); GOELZER, supra note 12.
15. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); GOELZER, supra note 12.
16. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); MORRISON 
& FOERSTER LLP, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE 12 (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/131223-A-Users-Guide-to-The-Volcker-
Rule.pdf 
17. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); Oliver Ireland
& Daniel Nathan, Bank Supervision: The Volcker Rule’s Trojan Horse for Smaller Banking 
Entities? [2014] Banking Daily (BNA) (Apr. 8, 2014). 
18. Final Rule § ____.7(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5781–82 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland &
Nathan, supra note 17. 
19. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule: Implementation and Impact, CORNELL 
UNIV. L. SCH., 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/conferences_and_events/banking/20
14/pdf/cms_volcker_whitehead_2014.pdf (noting the potentially problematic nature of the 
Prudential Backstops given the lack of guidance on specific activities that may be likely to 
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The Rule’s many proprietary trading exceptions and the 
restrictions the Prudential Backstops impose on those exceptions, force 
banking entities and Regulators to use what seems to be an excessive 
amount of discretion to distinguish between permissible and prohibited 
activity.20  Since many activities (e.g., market-making) are permissible 
under the Rule’s exceptions,21 banking entities engaging in these 
excepted activities will be greatly scrutinized by the Regulators.22  In-
depth scrutiny will ensure that such trading activity is permissible under 
the Prudential Backstops.23 
Regulators are given even more discretion as a result of the 
Prudential Backstops, which may implicate the Rule’s anti-evasion 
provision (“Anti-Evasion Provision”).24  The Anti-Evasion Provision 
delineates the Regulators’ authority to take action where there is 
“reasonable cause to believe that a banking entity” has engaged in activity 
that “functions as an evasion of the requirements” of the Rule.25  The 
Anti-Evasion Provision grants authority to each of the Regulators to order 
any banking entity, after providing appropriate due process and the 
opportunity for a hearing, to terminate any activity or dispose of any 
investments that functionally evade the requirements or violate the 
restrictions set forth in the Rule.26  The Regulators uphold the Anti-
Evasion Provision using the “reasonable cause” standard—which, is 
violate the Backstops). 
20. Deloitte, The Final Volcker Rule: 10 Issues for Banks to Consider, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
25, 2014), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/25/the-final-volcker-rule-10-
issues-for-banks-to-consider/. 
21. GOELZER, supra note 12.
22. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2 (indicating that while a banking entity may
be engaging in activity that it genuinely believes is within the permitted exceptions to the ban 
on proprietary trading, they could consequently face scrutiny by the Regulators as to whether 
such activity does in fact fall within the exceptions). 
23. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, VOLCKER RULE INTERIM
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES (June 2014) (discussing examples of the in-depth procedures with 
which regulators, such as the OCC, will use to evaluate banking entities’ compliance with the 
Rule); see also Whitehead, supra note 19 (noting that one of the potential challenges to the 
Prudential Backstops is how to make a clear distinction between prohibited and permissible 
activity given differences across firms, difference amongst financial markets, and the potential 
for banking entities to mask prohibited activities as permitted activities). 
24. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see infra Part III. 
25. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2); see infra Part III.
26. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2); Memorandum by Paul Weiss, The
Volcker Rule 5 (July 14, 2010); 
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/104137/PW14Jul10VR.pdf; see infra Part III. 
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simply that the entity’s activity could, or does, function as an evasion.27  
“Reasonable cause” by itself does not set a high bar for enforcement, and 
the phrase “functions as an evasion” lowers the bar further by seemingly 
indicating that no intent is necessary to violate the Provision.28 
This Note discusses both the Rule’s gaps in adequately 
identifying the types of transactions that would implicate the Prudential 
Backstops, as well as the ambiguous guidelines for compliance with, and 
enforcement of, the Anti-Evasion Provision.  Part II lays out how banking 
entities are expected to comply with the prohibition against proprietary 
trading, and the challenges in identifying activities permitted within the 
exceptions.29  Part III addresses the Anti-Evasion Provision and the 
enforcement problems it poses to banking entities and Regulators.30  Part 
IV discusses potential measures for reforming and clarifying the Anti-
Evasion Provision by analyzing a similar anti-evasion provision from the 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).31  Finally, Part V concludes by 
reiterating the importance of clarifying the Anti-Evasion Provision to 
facilitate compliance and ensure consistent enforcement of the Anti-
Evasion Provision.32 
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Prior to the Compliance Date, banking entities had to thoroughly 
examine and assess their current trading practices to determine whether, 
and how, they were engaging in proprietary trading.33  Banking entities 
mapped out their existing trading activities, covered fund activities, and 
investments and compared them to the Rule’s requirements.34  This 
27. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see infra Part III.
28. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); see PHILLIP HOFFMAN & TIMOTHY 
R. MCTAGGART, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, CLIENT ALERT: OBSERVATION 3.0: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE VOLCKER RULE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN 
BANKS INVESTING IN FOREIGN FUNDS Q.14 (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/clientalert010815.pdf (supporting the notion that an
entity does not need to have intent to evade the Rule, and instead, the activity need only
function like an evasion); see infra Part III.
29. See infra Part II; while the Rule’s prohibitions also extend to investment in covered
fund activities, this Note only addresses the challenges with proprietary trading. 
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part VI.
33. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 6.
34. Id.
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comparison allowed each entity to create a plan to conform its proprietary 
trading activities to the requirements of the Rule, or in the alternative, to 
terminate or divest such activity by the Compliance Date.35 
The specific compliance requirements vary depending on the size 
of the institution.36  Smaller banking entities—those that either do not 
have investments in covered funds or have consolidated assets less than 
$10 billion—have very limited compliance requirements.37  In fact, those 
smaller banking entities, sometimes called the “less active” entities38, 
which do not engage in any covered activities—permitted proprietary 
trading and investing in hedge funds—are not required to establish a 
compliance program unless, or until, they begin engaging in such 
activities.39  The smaller banking entities that have consolidated assets 
less than $10 billion and who engage in “modest” covered proprietary 
trading activities, have the option to incorporate the compliance 
requirements of the Final Implementing Rules into their existing 
compliance program—they can do this by adjusting their existing 
program and appropriately including references to the requirements of the 
Final Implementing Rules.40  Banking entities that have more than $10 
billion but less than $50 billion in consolidated assets, are required to 
adopt the general compliance program set forth by the Final 
Implementing Rules41—commonly known as the “six pillars.”42  More 
stringent compliance and reporting requirements43—in addition to what 
the six pillars require—apply to banking entities that have total 
35. Id. at 5–6.
36. Final Rule § ____.20(a), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); ARNOLD & 
PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7–9. 
37. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7.
38. Final Rule § ____.20(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
39. Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
40. Final Rule § ____.20(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland & Nathan,
supra note 17. 
41. 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351 (2015); 17 C.F.R. §§ 75, 255 (2015); Final Rule §
____.20(c)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17; 
DANIEL L. GOELZER, supra note 12. 
42. ANNETE L. NAZARETH ET AL., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, VOLCKER PROP 
TRADING PROVISIONS: HOW FIRMS ARE PREPARING 11 (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2015-06-
12_Volcker_Prop_Trading_Provisions_How_Firms_Are_Preparing.pdf. 
43. See Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (indicating that the larger banking entities who
engage in permitted proprietary trading, are to periodically provide the Regulators with 
reports regarding seven different quantitative metrics). 
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consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.44 
As to the first pillar, written policies and procedures, many 
entities have taken a three-tiered approach with their structure.45  The first 
tier includes a board-level policy, the second tier includes an entity-wide 
compliance manual, and the third tier has desk-specific policies and 
procedures.46 
The second pillar, a system of internal controls, is designed to 
track trading activity and monitor for any instances of prohibited 
activity.47  A large component of the internal controls system is 
determining the processes by which to communicate, internally and to the 
Regulators, those situations where prohibited activity has been, or may 
have been, identified.48  Each banking entity must also assess the manner 
in which the required metrics will be calculated and reported to the 
Regulators.49 
The third pillar sets out the expectation that banking entities will 
arrange their corporate governance in a manner that clearly and 
appropriately delegates responsibility and accountability for compliance 
with the Rule.50  Banking entities are expected to determine who from 
their boards, and senior management, will be responsible for overseeing 
the various components of compliance.51  Some of those delegated 
responsibilities include, arranging for training on the Rule and identifying 
the testing methods to be used for monitoring risky trading activity that 
44. Final Rule § ____.20(c)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also
Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (noting that a foreign entity who has U.S. assets “as of the 
previous calendar year end of $50 billion or more” is also subject to increased compliance 
requirements).  Additional entities may also be otherwise directed by regulators to comply 
with the enhanced requirements—these entities are simply notified by the relevant Regulator 
that they are to comply with the Enhanced Minimum Standards for Compliance Programs, set 
forth in Appendix B of the Rule.  Final Rule § ____.20(c)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 
(Jan. 31, 2014); see also Final Rule Appendix B, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5800–04 (Jan. 31, 2014) 
(detailing the additional minimum standards for an enhanced internal compliance program); 
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7. 
45. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(1), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11. 
46. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
47. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11. 
48. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11.
49. Id.
50. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 11. 
51. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 11,14.
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is in violation of the Rule.52 
Independent testing and auditing, which comprise the fourth 
pillar, are periodically required to assess the effectiveness of the entire 
compliance program.53  Such audits may be completed by qualified 
banking personnel, or by external auditors.54  Any deficiencies found in 
the compliance program, or other violations of the Rule, must be 
appropriately resolved.55 
The fifth pillar, training, requires banking entities to train senior 
management and those employees who work at the trading desks.56  
Trading desks are the units at the banking entity where “securities or other 
financial instruments are purchased or sold.”57  Such training is also 
necessary for any additional employees who would benefit from training 
on how to ensure that the compliance mechanisms are effectively 
implemented and followed.58 
Recordkeeping, the sixth pillar, is in many ways one of the most 
important requirements.59  This recordkeeping documentation serves to 
demonstrate compliance with the Rule.60  Such documentation should be 
retained for a minimum of five years and submitted to Regulators upon 
their request.61 
Banking entities under enhanced requirements have an additional 
responsibility that is not required of those entities subject only to the 
general compliance requirements.62  The chief executive officers (CEOs) 
of those entities under enhanced requirements must, in writing, make 
52. Id.
53. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(4), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 14. 
54. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(4), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014)
55. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8.
56. NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 14; Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17.
57. Final Rule Appendix A, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797–800 (Jan. 31, 2014) (defining
trading desk as “the smallest discrete unit of organization of a banking entity that purchases 
or sells financial instruments for the trading account of the banking entity or an affiliate 
thereof.”); Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17. 
58. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(5), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 14; Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17. 
59. See Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting
that records must be “sufficient to demonstrate compliance”). 
60. Id.; NAZARETH ET AL., supra note 42, at 14.
61. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH 
ET AL., supra note 42, at 14. 
62. Final Rule § ____.20(c), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014).
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annual attestations regarding their institution.63  These CEO attestations 
certify that the institution has an appropriate Rule compliance program in 
place that also accounts for processes by which to review and modify the 
program for continued compliance with the Rule.64 
While the pillars of compliance themselves are straightforward, 
the standard by which compliance programs are to assess bank activity is 
riddled with exceptions.65  The number of exceptions to the prohibited 
activities complicates institutions’ ability to clearly determine whether 
any improper trades were made.66  Additionally, because the Rule does 
not provide any definitive criteria for clearly identifying impermissible 
high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies,67 it is unclear how banking 
entities are expected to know when their trading activity is potentially in 
violation of the Rule.  In addition to a lack of a clear standard for 
identifying improper activity, the Regulators have even broader 
discretion in deciding whether certain activity is a violation of the Anti-
Evasion Provision.68  This lack of clarity presents the risk that the Rule 
and its Anti-Evasion Provision will be inconsistently applied and 
enforced.69  However, the reporting requirement under which banking 
63. Final Rule Appendix B, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5803 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 14. 
64. Final Rule § ____.20(c), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); NAZARETH ET
AL., supra note 42, at 14. 
65. See Ireland & Nathan, supra note 17 (“The risk to a firm engaging in exempted
activities are only increased by the fact that the conditions that would cause an otherwise 
permitted activity to be impermissible are defined somewhat subjectively.”). 
66. Deena Zaidi, The ‘Fine Print’ of the Volcker Rule, THE MARKET MOGUL (Aug. 17,
2015), http://themarketmogul.com/fine-print-volcker-rule/. 
67. Final Rule § ____.7(a)(2), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also Kobi
Kastiel, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, THE VOLCKER RULE: A FIRST LOOK 
AT KEY CHANGES 2 (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/2013-12-18-the-volcker-rule-a-first-
look-at-key-changes.pdf (acknowledging that the Rule “does not provide any definitive 
criteria for identifying those assets or strategies.”). 
68. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012) (describing the level of discretion, “reasonable cause,”
given to Regulators for identifying violations of the Anti-Evasion Provision).
69. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (noting that the
Regulators are to “consult and coordinate with each other” to ensure that the Final 
Implementing Rules from each Regulator are comparable with one another); see also Deanna 
J. Hayes, Will the Volcker Rule’s Complexity Be Its Undoing? U. PA. REG. BLOG (July 22,
2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/07/22/hayes-volcker-rule-complexity/ (pointing out that
the Regulators may have differing approaches for how to handle potential problems with
proprietary trading, given the lack of clearly defined activities, which may lead to potential
conflict amongst the five agencies).
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entities must report a specific set of data to the Regulators, may serve as 
an effective tool for the Regulators to better assess how banking entities 
are conducting their trading activity and to provide the necessary 
guidance, over time, for best identifying violations of the Rule.70 
The quantitative metrics reported by banking entities are intended 
to enable the Regulators to evaluate whether such reporting measures are 
adequate for their process of accurately identifying and differentiating 
between appropriate and prohibited trading activity.71  All seven 
reporting metrics are to be calculated daily for each trading desk, and for 
those banking entities with assets greater than $50 billion, reported 
monthly.72  Other banks will only report quarterly.73  When submitting 
their final reports to the Regulators, each entity will need to calculate an 
aggregated figure based on the metrics collected from each of their 
trading desks.74  Such measurements are used to monitor each entity’s 
trading activity and subsequently evaluate whether such activities are 
consistent with the requirements set forth by the Rule.75  Upon evaluating 
the first set of data, Regulators will evaluate what changes, if any, are 
required to enhance the metrics reporting requirement and fulfill the 
requirement’s purpose of facilitating the distinction between improper 
and permissible trading activity.76 
70. CHRIS COLLINS ET AL., IMPLEMENTING VOLCKER: WHO SETS THE STANDARDS FOR
COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING?  CROSSINGS: THE SAPIENT J. OF TRADING & RISK MGMT. 6–7 
(Spring 2014), 
http://www.sapient.com/content/dam/sapient/sapientglobalmarkets/pdf/thought-
leadership/SGM_Crossings_Spring2014.pdf; see also MAYER ET AL., supra note 10 
(suggesting that the data collected from, and reported by, the banking entities will be useful 
for identifying whether violations have occurred). 
71. See Final Rule Appendix A (identifying the seven quantitative measures as risk and
position limits and usage; risk factor sensitivities; value-at-risk and stress VaR; 
comprehensive profit and loss attribution; inventory turnover; inventory aging; and customer-
facing trade ration); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6–7. 
72. Final Rule Appendix A (defining trading desk as, “the smallest discrete unit of
organization of a banking entity that purchases or sells financial instruments for the trading 
account of the banking entity or an affiliate thereof”); see also Ireland & Nathan, supra note 
17. 
73. Final Rule § ____.20(d)(3), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); COLLINS ET
AL., supra note 70, at 6. 
74. Chris Kentouris, The Volcker Rule: Managing the Seven Deadly Metrics, FINOPS 
REP. (July 30, 2015), http://finops.co/trading/the-volcker-rule-managing-the-seven-deadly-
metrics/. 
75. Final Rule Appendix A, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797–5800 (Jan. 31, 2014).
76. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6–7.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANTI-EVASION PROVISION
Although the Rule as a whole is problematic,77 one of the biggest 
concerns is that the vague distinction between permissible activities and 
proprietary trading will lead to inconsistent application of the Rule.78  
This lack of clarity may result in conflicts of interest amongst these 
agencies79 as well as present a further challenge to the banking entities as 
they establish appropriate protocols to safeguard themselves from 
accusations of violating the Rule.80 
Specifically, the Anti-Evasion Provision, which grants the 
Regulators authority to disallow permitted activities that “function as an 
evasion” of the Rule, does not provide a clear definition of, or guidelines 
for, what actually constitutes an evasion.81  Additionally, the “reasonable 
cause”82 standard is ambiguous and grants the Regulators extensive 
discretionary power in determining whether impermissible, functionally 
evasive activity has occurred.83  Lastly, the absence of bright-line rules 
as to how the Regulators will identify and enforce violations of the Anti-
Evasion Provision reflects the potential for conflict amongst the 
Regulators caused by differing interpretations of the Provision.84 
77. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 6 (acknowledging that the final
regulations present numerous interpretive and implementation challenges); see also Zaidi, 
supra note 66 (highlighting the ambiguous language, unclear definitions, and challenges of 
having numerous exceptions to the limits on proprietary trading). 
78. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that the Rule does not
have any way for the banking entities to seek “coordinated guidance” from the Regulators, 
and indicating that there was uncertainty as to how the Regulators would coordinate with one 
another as to matters of Rule interpretation and implementation). 
79. Zaidi, supra note 66.
80. See id. (stating that the numerous requirements of the rule, and the exceptions, have
made the implementation process more complex, and that the banks’ task to “make this fine 
distinction between core banking functions and proprietary trading every single day” could 
be both troublesome and costly). 
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012). 
82. Id.
83. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (noting that “. . . it needs to only be a ‘reasonable
belief,’ which can provide for a wide spectrum of interpretation when a Regulatory Agency 
is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”). 
84. See Zaidi, supra note 66 (making note that amongst the Regulators there is a “high
probability of inconsistency and lack of coordination that could result in conflict of interests”). 
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A. Identifying Evasion
The Regulators must establish how they will determine whether 
a banking entity has, in fact, evaded the Rule, and even more importantly, 
how they will identify whether the alleged evasions were intentional or 
accidental.85  Because there are many exceptions to the ban on proprietary 
trading, along with additional Prudential Backstops limiting the 
exceptions, it is unclear how banking entities can maintain appropriate 
controls to avoid accidental evasion of the Rule.86 
The Anti-Evasion Provision allocates to Regulators the authority 
to take action where there is “reasonable cause to believe”87 that a 
banking entity has engaged in an activity that “functions as an evasion of 
the requirements” of the Rule.88  Based on the wording of the Anti-
Evasion Provision, it is unclear what “functions as an evasion” actually 
means.89  Black’s Law Dictionary defines evasion as “a subtle 
endeavoring to set aside truth or to escape the punishment of law.”90  The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines evasion as “the act of avoiding 
something that you do not want to do or deal with or, a statement or action 
that avoids directly dealing with something.”91  Based on both dictionary 
definitions, the word “evasion” implies that a person consciously and 
purposefully intends to avoid something.92  By adding, “functions as an 
evasion,” the language of the Anti-Evasion Provision appears to 
encompass all activity that results in evasion, regardless of intent.93  
Failure to specify in the Anti-Evasion Provision whether evasive 
activities arise only out of gross negligence or a willful intent to violate 
85. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.  While the Provision as it stands holds banking
entities accountable for both intentional and accidental “evasions,” being able to properly 
identify the banking entity’s intent, or lack thereof, may assist Regulators with determining a 
“fair” penalty, as well as help banking entities establish adequate defenses to their alleged 
offenses.  See id. (noting that the offensive activity “only needs to function like an evasion, or 
otherwise violate the Volcker Rule”) (emphasis added). 
86. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2) (2012) (listing the limitations on the
permitted activities); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10. 
87. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Evasion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/evasion/ (last
visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
91. Evasion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/evasion (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
92. BLACK’S, supra note 90; MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 91.
93. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
2016] VOLCKER RULE: ANTI-EVASION 397 
the Rule means that banking entities are subject to penalty even for 
accidental violations.94 
Identifying evasion then, perhaps rests on whether the questioned 
activity has triggered the Prudential Backstops.95  Additionally, banking 
entities may intentionally try to evade the Rule’s prohibition on 
proprietary trading and covered fund activities “by shifting activity and 
investments to subsidiaries,”96 which will be important to examine when 
evaluating whether enforcement action should be taken.  The ambiguous 
nature of the Anti-Evasion Provision’s “functions as an evasion” 
language, leaves unanswered the questions of what exactly the Regulators 
are looking for and what consequences banking entities will face when, 
despite good faith efforts to comply, their trading activity nonetheless 
violates the Rule.97 
B. What is “Reasonable Cause?”
As written, the Anti-Evasion Provision only requires that 
Regulators have “reasonable cause” in order to allege that there was a 
violation.98  Neither the Anti-Evasion Provision, nor the Final 
Implementing Rules, however, provide any additional guidance as to 
what specific activity would warrant a Regulator’s nullification of that 
entity’s investment activity.99  This poses a significant problem for 
banking entities that need the certainty of knowing in advance what 
activities may subject them to regulatory action100 for violating the Anti-
94. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (articulating that a banking entity likely does not
need to have intended to evade the Provision in order to be held liable). 
95. See Final Rule § ____.7, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014) (laying out the
exceptions to the exemptions from the prohibitions of the Rule); see also SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that these overriding limitations are referred 
by the Regulators as “prudential backstops”). 
96. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
97. See id. at 1 (noting that “in the absence of further clarification or precedent, the anti-
evasion provision raises significant interpretative challenges for industry participants and 
practitioners.”). 
98. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79
Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014). 
99. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79
Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014). 
100. See Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that
banking entities themselves must also, upon “discovery” of a potential violation, “promptly 
terminate the activity and, as relevant, dispose of the investment.”). 
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Evasion Provision.101  The “reasonable cause” standard does not appear 
to be a particularly difficult threshold to reach.102 Because the Regulators 
can broadly interpret “reasonable,” The Anti-Evasion Provision affords 
the Regulators a great deal of interpretative power to decide what trading 
practices and activities are evasions of the Rule.103  The Rule does not 
specify the grounds on which a regulator would have “reasonable cause” 
to believe that proprietary trading activity had occurred, which also 
leaves banking entities in the dark as to the circumstances under which 
their trading activity may be held to be evasive.104 
With such an extensive range of discretion embedded in the 
“reasonable cause” standard, the Regulators when scrutinizing an entity’s 
activity, may have differing interpretations of what activity is 
impermissible.105  Additionally, the statute explicitly mandates an 
affirmative duty of banking entities to self-report any violations of the 
Rule “upon discovery,”106 which places the banking entities in murky 
territory with respect to recognizing when they may have evaded the 
Rule.  Without a clear understanding of the criteria that Regulators will 
use to identify violations, banking entities may not be able to adequately 
fulfill their duty to self-report violations. 
The ambiguous Anti-Evasion Provision results in uncertainty as 
to how the Regulators will justify legal action based on “reasonable 
cause,”107 whether the Regulators will make joint decisions with regard 
to interpretative issues, and how significant challenges to the 
interpretation of the Provision will be resolved.108 
C. Enforcement Concerns
The Anti-Evasion Provision provides that the Regulators’ anti-
evasion enforcement authority is in addition to their already established 
101. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. (noting that “reasonable belief . . . can provide for a wide spectrum of
interpretation when a Regulatory Agency is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”). 
104. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012).
105. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
106. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Final Rule § ___.21(a), 79 Fed.
Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014). 
107. Final Rule § ___.21(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
108. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 18.
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enforcement authorities.109  Banking entities may be subject to criminal 
and civil penalties by multiple regulators, since the Anti-Evasion 
Provision does not set forth a standard penalty for all Regulators.110  As 
a result, banking entities may face both increased monetary fines and 
administrative action.111  The Anti-Evasion Provision states that it 
provides the Regulators with anti-evasion enforcement authority—
though this grant of authority is not clearly defined—which, includes a 
new power to nullify trading or investment activities, and to force a 
banking entity to stop proprietary trading, provided that the Regulator has 
“reasonable cause” to believe that the entity engaged in activity that 
functioned as an evasion.112  The Anti-Evasion Provision also relies on 
the fact that each of the Regulators has their own enforcement 
capabilities.113  Because the Rule is predominantly a banking rule, the 
SEC and CFTC have the least power and responsibility to enforce the 
Rule.114  However, many institutions are subject to regulation by several 
of the five Regulators.115 
109. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012); Memorandum, Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, The Volcker Rule And Private Funds: Final Regulations Are Out 17 (Dec. 
16, 2013), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-
content/publications/pub1672.pdf. 
110. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT EVOLUTION: Who Will Enforce The Volcker Rule,
And How? (July 23, 2015), 
http://csfme.org/News/TabId/120/ArtMID/983/ArticleID/306/Who-Will-Enforce-the-
Volcker-Rule-and-How.aspx. 
111. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N., Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z 4–5 (2015),
http://training.cuna.org/self_study/regtrac/member_regtrac/download/M4_SEC1.pdf. 
112. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1; MILBANK, CLIENT ALERT: OUT OF THE FRYING-
PAN INTO THE FIRE: ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOLCKER RULE BY THE FIVE AGENCIES 2–3 (July 
21, 2015), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/2/1/21066/Out-of-the-Frying-Pan.pdf. 
113. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION, supra note 110.
114. See id. (pointing out that while many financial institutions have functions that are
overseen by the SEC and CFTC, the fact that their Volcker regulations are in accordance with 
the BHC Act, these agencies may not be able to use the enforcement methods to which they 
are accustomed, when enforcing the Rule); see also GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP, PUB’N: 
THE FINAL VOLCKER RULE 2 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/TheFinalVolckerRule.pdf (indicating 
that differing Agency enforcement approaches may present challenges to those banking 
entities that  in addition to bank regulators, are also subject to “activities-based supervision” 
such as swap dealing). 
115. See Henry Engler, Volcker Rule Enforcement: Regulators Attempt a United Front
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/02/19/volcker-
rule-enforcement-regulators-attempt-a-united-front/ (providing examples of where a banking 
entity may be regulated by more than one agency; for instance the article notes that where a 
derivative transaction originates within the “banking” side of the firm, but then hedges with a 
broker-dealer, both the OCC and SEC may intervene to evaluate whether the activity was 
proprietary or not). 
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For violations of the Anti-Evasion Provision, in addition to being 
permitted to mandate termination of the questionable trading and 
investment activity, each of the Regulators can rely on its existing 
powers, including imposing hefty monetary penalties for violations of 
any law or regulation.116  The potential conflict between the Regulators 
arises when multiple Regulators,117 all of whom could impose penalties 
in the event of an alleged evasion of the Rule, have some authority over 
a single institution.118  Without any bright-line rules as to what activities 
fall into the exceptions granted to the ban on proprietary trading, the 
Regulators may differ in their interpretation of improper activity and 
disputes may arise.119  Given the potential double liability, there is a risk 
that banking entities may also try to shift their investment and trading 
activity to other entities that are not subject to the Rule’s regulations, 
namely the shadow banking system, which is unregulated.120 
If claims for violating the Anti-Evasion Provision are brought 
against them, another necessary consideration for banking entities is the 
most effective way in which they can prove to the Regulators that their 
activity complies with the Rule.121  It is important for banking entities to 
both analyze how investment activity will most appropriately be tracked 
and assess how adequate records will be best maintained—this will make 
sure that all trading activity is within the boundaries set by the Prudential 
Backstops and the Rule.122  Strict adherence to the compliance program 
116. Peter J. Henning, Don’t Expect Eye-Popping Fines for Volcker Rule Violations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/dont-expect-eye-popping-
fines-for-volcker-rule-violations/?_r=0. 
117. See Engler, supra note 115 (providing examples of where a banking entity may be
regulated by more than one agency; for instance, the article notes that where a derivative 
transaction originates within the “banking” side of the firm, but then hedges with a broker-
dealer, both the OCC and SEC may intervene to evaluate whether the activity was proprietary 
or not). 
118. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION, supra note 110.
119. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2; see also GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER, supra note
114, at 2 (indicating that “Because the Final Rule’s distinction between permitted and 
prohibited proprietary trading activities is so principles-based . . . [it] may give rise to widely 
differing Agency enforcement approaches.”). 
120. See Much Ado About Trading, THE ECONOMIST (July 25, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21659671-next-great-regulation-
tame-banks-now-place-much-ado-about-trading (referring to the shadow banking system, to 
which trading may be shifted since that sector is unregulated). 
121. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.
122. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9 (describing that for banking entities
with more than $50 billion, reporting will be done every month while all other entities will 
report quarterly.  All banking entities will need to submit documentation that confirms that 
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requirements will likely allow banking entities to present to Regulators 
investment activity tracking information as well as identify those 
individuals responsible for monitoring trading activity and documenting 
all compliance measures.123 
IV. GUIDANCE FOR REFORMING AND CLARIFYING THE ANTI-EVASION
PROVISION 
Preserving the safety and soundness of banks lies at the heart of 
all banking regulations.124  Risk management is facilitated through the 
use of internal controls and compliance measures such as the ones 
mandated in the Final Implementing Rules.125  There is an expectation 
that banking entities refrain from engaging in activity that will be 
disruptive to the financial stability of the United States.126  In order to 
limit any such disruption, the Anti-Evasion Provision gives Regulators 
broad discretion to invalidate and terminate any activity that by 
“reasonable cause”127 is deemed an evasion of the Rule’s prohibited 
activities.128  The Rule details what internal compliance program 
requirements are necessary to avoid violating the Rule’s prohibitions,129 
but it does not provide specific guidelines that outline exactly what 
activities are prohibited and the manner in which Regulators can 
appropriately enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision.130 
As the Rule’s effectiveness is evaluated, policymakers may 
consider providing a higher standard than “reasonable cause” by which 
Regulators enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision.131  Imposing a higher 
each sponsored fund is not actually a covered fund—detailed records must be maintained for 
at least five years to demonstrate compliance with the Rule). 
123. Final Rule § ____.20(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); ARNOLD &
PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
124. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
125. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7–9 (overviewing the various risk
management tools to be implemented by the banking entities). 
126. Final Rule § ___.7, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5786–87 (Jan. 31, 2014).
127. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 2. 
128. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 2. 
129. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
130. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–2.
131. See id. at 2 (indicating that the current standard “to support a regulatory enforcement
is not high.”). 
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standard would require a statutory change; however, it would help to 
reduce the amount of discretion allowed to Regulators for determining 
whether a banking entity’s trading activity “functions as an evasion” and 
thus, provide more uniformity across Regulators with respect to Rule and 
Anti-Evasion Provision enforcement.132  Additionally, policymakers may 
benefit from analyzing TILA’s Regulation Z and utilizing the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) for guidance on how to best reform 
the Rule for enhanced compliance.133 
A. Learning From TILA’s Regulation Z
A close look at other anti-evasion provisions such as Regulation 
Z,134 the implementing regulation of TILA,135 may prove useful when 
considering how the Anti-Evasion Provision may be improved.  For 
instance, revisions to the Provision may include adopting a “safe harbor” 
provision similar to that contained in Regulation Z.136 
The primary function of TILA is to promote the informed use of 
consumer credit—in order to do so, certain disclosures must be made to 
inform consumers about the costs associated with borrowing.137  Like the 
Rule, where the type of compliance measures required depend on the size 
of the entity,138 Regulation Z is formatted such that the specific rules by 
which creditors must abide, depend on the type of credit (open-end or 
closed-end) being offered.139  With respect to high-cost mortgage 
loans,140 Regulation Z’s anti-evasion provision provides that where credit 
132. See id. (making clear that there will be “a wide spectrum of interpretation when a
Regulatory Agency is scrutinizing an investment or activity.”). 
133. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Frequently Asked
Questions: What is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and What Does It Do? 
(2015) [hereinafter FSOC], 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx. 
134. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2016).
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f.
136. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016) (detailing the “safe harbor,” or
presumption of compliance, on which loan originators may rely provided certain conditions 
are met); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4. 
137. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, TILA 5 (June
2013) [hereinafter CFPB CONSUMER LAWS], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-regulations_tila-combined-june-
2013.pdf. 
138. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 7.
139. CFPB CONSUMER LAWS, supra note 137, at 3.
140. See Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024, 1026 (2016) (defining “high-cost
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is secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling, which does not meet the 
definition of open-end credit as defined in § 226.2 of TILA, a creditor 
may not attempt to evade the requirements by structuring a home-secured 
loan as an open-end plan.141  The provision provides a clear structure for 
what will be considered an evasion; this not only better guides consumers 
with their decision-making, but also it assists the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in exercising its enforcement authority.142  
In fact, the Fed commented that Regulation Z’s anti-evasion provision 
was meant to reach those instances where a creditor had “no reasonable 
expectation that the substance of the transaction warranted its form,” 
which implies that the totality of the circumstances must be assessed, as 
opposed to simply relying on what a particular trading activity or 
investment is called.143  Although both Regulation Z and the Rule’s Anti-
Evasion Provision require an interpretation of what is reasonable, the 
standard of Regulation Z is “different, and arguably higher, than the 
Volcker Rule’s anti-evasion provision.”144 
The Anti-Evasion Provision currently does not set forth clear 
criteria as to how evasion is to be defined or assessed.145  Rather, the Anti-
Evasion Provision merely describes the Regulators’ ability to intervene 
for any activity which functions as an evasion or otherwise violates the 
restrictions set forth in the Rule.146  TILA, however, includes both 
criminal and civil liability provisions that account exclusively for willful 
violations of the requirements set out in TILA.147  Willful violations 
under TILA’s criminal liability provisions could result in fines up to 
mortgage loans” as home-equity mortgage loans with high interest rates or high fees). 
141. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(4) (2016).
142. THE FEDERAL RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: REGULATION Z: TRUTH 
IN LENDING ACT 2 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/til.pdf [hereinafter Consumer 
Compliance Handbook].  The Dodd-Frank Act amended TILA and also granted rulemaking 
authority to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  Id. 
143. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (stating that “Anti-evasion provisions have the
common foundation allowing enforcement agencies to be able to make a substance-over-form 
determination”); see also ALSTON & BIRD, TAX BLOG: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM? (Sept. 28, 
2011), http://www.alstontax.com/substance-over-form/ (describing the “substance over 
form” doctrine as a way to say that some ‘facts’ that are relevant for tax purposes are mostly 
controlled by common law fact finding and not labels). 
144. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012). 
146. Id.
147. CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N., supra note 111.
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$5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year, whereas in a civil suit, 
creditors may be required to pay monetary damages and restitution.148  
These provisions clearly demarcate the types of acts that would warrant 
criminal or civil liability; such specificity is a practical tool to inform 
creditors of the ways in which they may be held liable.149 
As previously discussed, courts are not inclined to hold a creditor 
liable for damages where the defendant has shown a sincere, good faith, 
effort to comply with TILA.150  Similarly detailed criminal and civil 
liability provisions would be a positive addition to the Anti-Evasion 
Provision, and would be advantageous to both the Regulators and 
banking entities.  These provisions would clarify the circumstances under 
which a banking entity may be required to pay a fine in addition to being 
ordered to cease and desist from any prohibited activity.151 
Additionally, an important section of Regulation Z that prohibits 
steering,152 outlines a review process by which transactions will be 
evaluated to see whether they are “in the consumer’s interest.”153  
Transactions are compared to all other possible loan offers available to 
that consumer by the same loan originator at that time.154  As it can be 
148. See CFPB CONSUMER LAWS, supra note 137, at 40 (noting that enforcement agencies
may order restitution when disclosure errors to consumers result from a clear and consistent 
pattern of violations, gross negligence, or a willful violation that was intended to mislead the 
person to whom the credit was extended). 
149. Id. at 39–40.
150. Welmaker v. WT Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (holding that the
defendant did not intentionally violate TILA as he had made good faith efforts to comply with 
the Act); see Consumer Compliance Handbook, supra note 119, at 4 (“Good faith compliance 
with the commentary protects creditors from civil liability under TILA.”); CREDIT UNION
NAT’L ASS’N, supra note 111. 
151. See Final Rule § ___.21(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that the
Regulators “may take any action permitted by law to enforce compliance . . .  including 
directing the banking entity to restrict, limit, or terminate any or all activities under this part 
and dispose of any investment.”) (emphasis added).  Currently, the lack of bright-line rules 
makes it difficult for banking entities to not only ascertain under what circumstances they 
may be held in violation of the Anti-Evasion Provision, but also the specific penalties to which 
they may be subject.  Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012). 
152. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT ALERT: FINAL RULE GOVERNING LOAN
ORIGINATOR COMPENSATION PRACTICES 8 (Aug. 31, 2010) [hereinafter MORRISON & 
FOERSTER, LOAN ORIGINATOR], 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/100831FinalRule.pdf (defining steering as, 
“advising, counseling, or otherwise influencing a consumer to accept a particular 
transaction.”). 
153. Id. at 9.
154. Id.
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difficult to determine whether a transaction will be helpful or detrimental 
to the consumer’s interest, loan originators are encouraged to utilize the 
safe harbor provided by Regulation Z.155 This safe harbor essentially 
recognizes three different types of transactions which would safeguard 
the loan originator from enforcement action.156  So long as the transaction 
information is presented according to the criteria stated in the provision, 
along with the loan originator’s “good faith belief”157 that the loan options 
presented are those for which the consumer actually qualifies, the loan 
originator will be protected.158 
Like Regulation Z’s prohibition against steering, the Rule’s 
Prudential Backstops address the types of activities that will be 
considered violations of the Rule, such as anything that creates conflicts 
of interests with clients or results in “material exposures to high-risk 
assets.”159  As previously highlighted, there is a great amount of 
ambiguity surrounding how such conflicts and “material exposures” are 
to be determined both by the banking entities as they engage in such 
activity, and for the Regulators in terms of how they enforce the Anti-
Evasion Provision.160  Lack of clarity regarding the definition of evasive 
activity161 may indicate that a safe harbor provision like that in Regulation 
Z162 would be appropriate for the Rule. 
Compliance is presumed if transactions fall within the safe harbor 
in Regulation Z.163  Likewise, a safe harbor provision for the Rule might 
outline specific activities or categories of activities that are in the best 
interest of the consumer and do not pose a risk to the financial stability 
of the United States and thus, are compliant with the Prudential 
155. Regulation Z,12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016); MORRISON & FOERSTER, LOAN
ORIGINATOR, supra note 152, at 10–11. 
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A) (2012); see also GOELZER, supra note 12. 
160. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014).
161. Id.; see also Zaidi, supra note 66 (emphasizing that there are a “lack of clear
distinctive activities.”). 
162. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.36(e)(2)–(4) (2016); see also MORRISON & FOERSTER,
LOAN ORIGINATOR, supra note 152, at 10 (describing the types of transactions falling within 
the safe harbor). 
163. THE FEDERAL RESERVE: COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO SMALL ENTITIES, REGULATION Z:
LOAN ORIGINATOR COMPENSATION AND STEERING, (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE], http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/regzcg.htm. 
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Backstops.164  Such detailed information may also include extremely 
precise metric measuring, reporting, and assessment methods—if a 
banking entity can show that they in good faith implemented the stated 
methods, their activity can fall within the safe harbor.  Specific criteria, 
which directly outline what is and is not permissible, will provide banking 
entities an effective system by which to assess their compliance and allow 
the safe harbor to be met.165  As in Regulation Z, a good faith clause 
would be advisable so as to minimize the claims brought against banking 
entities for unintentional evasive activity since “prohibited activities . . . 
are in some cases extremely difficult to distinguish from permitted 
activities.”166 
Although the notion of good faith is not explicitly stated in the 
Anti-Evasion Provision, the strict requirements that mandate internal 
controls such as verification and documentation of all activity, reporting 
of metrics, and comprehensive training regarding compliance, are all 
intended to prevent evasion, as these measures “help monitor potential 
evasions of the prohibitions and restrictions” of the Rule.167  The 
substance-over-form doctrine that lies at the core of all anti-evasion 
provisions168 will mean that any claims made against a banking entity will 
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, utilizing all of the facts and 
circumstances presented regarding the nature of the offending activity.169  
Similar to how loan originators must demonstrate that their loan 
transactions adhere to the criteria set forth in Regulation Z’s safe harbor 
section, the Regulators could examine the entity’s adherence to the Rule’s 
internal monitoring and reporting requirements to assess whether the 
entity in good faith attempted to comply with the Anti-Evasion 
Provision.170  Banking entities can be required to present comprehensive 
164. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A); GOELZER, supra note 12.
165. THE FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 163.
166. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 3.
167. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2; David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy, The
Volcker Rule: A Legal Analysis, Congressional Research Service, R43340 Summary (Mar. 
27, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43440.pdf. 
168. See MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (stating that “Anti-evasion provisions have the
common foundation allowing enforcement agencies to be able to make a substance-over-form 
determination.”). 
169. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
170. PWC LLP, FS REGULATORY BRIEF: THE VOLCKER RULE: HOW MUCH FAITH IS GOOD 
FAITH? (2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-
services/publications/assets/pwc-volcker-rule-food-faith-compliance.pdf (illustrating 
examples of tangible actions that banking entities may use to demonstrate “good faith”). 
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documentation, or “business justification,” demonstrating that their 
activity was within the scope of permissible activity.171  Given that 
banking entities are already expected to maintain adequate records for 
five years, presenting such justification to show good faith compliance 
with the Rule could help to eliminate unnecessary enforcement action for 
activity that was in no way meant to evade the Rule’s requirements.172 
B. Utilizing FSOC
The Regulators have the ultimate authority for interpreting which 
activity is impermissible or evasive.173  Where there is uncertainty and 
lack of clarity, the Regulators may benefit from having a mediator assist 
with interpretation and help to streamline the enforcement process so as 
not to be unfair or inconsistent.174  FSOC, which is responsible for 
identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States and 
responding to such threats to financial stability, may be in the best 
position to serve as mediator.175  Another possible mediator could be the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”), an 
interagency body that has the authority to establish “uniform principles, 
standards, and report forms” for examining financial institutions by the 
FRB, FDIC, OCC, CFPB, and the National Credit Union 
Administration.176  The FFIEC can also make recommendations that 
would provide more uniformity in the supervision of financial 
institutions.177  In theory, FFIEC appears to have vested in it the power to 
provide the uniformity for enforcement amongst Regulators that the Anti-
Evasion Provision currently lacks.  However, because the FFIEC does 
171. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
172. Final Rule § ____.20(b)(6), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); see also
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 6, at 8–9 (highlighting that entities will need to submit 
documentation that confirms that each sponsored fund is not actually a covered fund, and 
noting that detailed records must be maintained for at least five years to demonstrate 
compliance with The Rule). 
173. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5796–97 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 2. 
174. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 13, at 17–18 (outlining some concerns
with respect to coordination between Regulators—one of them being, to whom the regulators 
will direct any interpretative questions). 
175. FSOC, supra note 133.
176. FFIEC: FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, About the FFIEC: Mission,
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm. 
177. Id.
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not include the SEC, which is also a critical player in the Final 
Implementing Rules and the Anti-Evasion Provision, utilizing the FFIEC 
as a mediator may not adequately resolve the existing enforcement 
inconsistencies.178 
As a mediator, FSOC could step in to clarify best practices for the 
banking entities to ensure that their activity is not at risk of being 
considered an evasion of the Rule, as well as to provide additional and 
stricter standards to the Regulators to aid with enforcement.179  Without 
more consistency, banking entities may face dual action from the various 
Regulators.180  While the Regulators acknowledge that a banking entity 
may at times be subject to multiple Regulators’ authority, they have 
repeatedly “rejected the idea of having a lead enforcer or interpreter of 
the Volcker Rule regulations” and instead, have opted to “coordinate their 
activities” in an effort to “limit duplicative actions and undue costs and 
burdens.”181  Such duplicative administrative action and civil money 
penalties will inevitably pose an undue cost and burden on U.S. financial 
institutions, which could lead to financial distress and present the type of 
risk to the financial stability of the United States that FSOC ultimately 
seeks to prevent.182 
Given that the Regulators may differ in their application of 
“reasonable cause”183 when identifying evasive activity, it may also be 
advisable to designate an interpretative mediator.  FSOC, which 
conducted a 2011 study184 regarding the Rule’s implementation, may be 
178. Id.
179. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
112, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012) (laying out the FSOC’s charge to identify risks to the financial 
stability of the United States). 
180. Whitehead, supra note 19.
181. MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
182. Whitehead, supra note 19.
183. Final Rule § ___.21(a)–(b), 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5797 (Jan. 31, 2014); MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 4. 
184. See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUND & 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS (Jan. 2011), www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.; see also 
SHEARMAN & STERLING, CLIENT PUBLICATION: FSOC STUDY ON IMPLEMENTING THE VOLCKER
RULE—A SERIES OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND SOME SURPRISES (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/files/newsinsights/publications/2011/01/fsoc-study-on-
implementing-the-volcker-rule—a-s__/files/view-full-memo-fsoc-study-on-implementing-
the-vo__/fileattachment/fia012411fsocstudyonimplementingthevolckerrule.pdf 
(summarizing and reviewing the FSOC study’s recommendations). 
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the most appropriate party to serve as an interpreter when the Regulators 
are unsure of whether or not a banking entity’s activity goes beyond the 
Prudential Backstops.  In its initial study, FSOC did not provide any 
recommendations as to what steps the Regulators may take to incorporate 
the safety and soundness component of the Prudential Backstops into 
their regulatory frameworks.185  Without a consistent approach to 
regulation and enforcement of the Prudential Backstops, compliance is 
more challenging, which may cause a banking entity to run afoul of its 
responsibility to engage in safe and sound financial practices.186  Since 
Congress has already, within the Rule, granted FSOC the power to 
coordinate supervisory activities, FSOC seems to be an optimal solution 
to resolving some of the Rule’s ambiguities and the potential 
inconsistencies amongst the Regulators.187  If FSOC is unwilling or 
unable to serve as an actual intermediary or supervisory authority for the 
Regulators, then at the very least, it could use its authority to make 
recommendations “to apply new or heightened standards and safeguards 
for financial activities or practices.”188 
The scope of FSOC’s recommendations would likely depend on 
the results of the metric reporting data review.189  Once the Regulators 
identify the nature of the trading activity taking place across entities, post-
conformance, FSOC may be better able to suggest how each institution 
can modify its internal practices to monitor for prohibited trading activity.  
Similarly, once the data has been compiled and reviewed, FSOC may also 
be able to provide guidance to the Regulators on ways to alter the metric 
reporting requirements to ease their enforcement burden while still 
maintaining strict compliance with the Rule.190 
185. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, NEWS BULLETIN: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL VOLCKER RULE STUDY 3 (Feb. 2011), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110214_Review_of_FSOC_Volcker_Rule_Stu
dy.pdf (stating that the study merely “encourage[d] the Agencies to incorporate the safety and 
soundness limitations into the framework and procedures adopted to assure compliance with 
the Volcker Rule.”). 
186. Ken E Bentsen Jr., Holes in the Volcker Rule, THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/199744-holes-in-the-volcker-rule. 
187. Id.
188. Norbert J. Michel, The Financial Stability Oversight Council: Helping to Enshrine
“Too Big to Fail,” (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/the-
financial-stability-oversight-council-helping-to-enshrine-too-big-to-fail. 
189. Supra Part II.
190. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 70, at 6 (indicating that after the metric reporting data
is collected and reviewed, the requirements for such reporting may be adjusted). 
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V. CONCLUSION
While the numerous exceptions to the Rule’s ban on proprietary 
trading favor banking entities and afford them greater flexibility with 
their trading activity than would be feasible under a stricter version of the 
Rule,191 these exceptions may be causing more harm than good.  The 
exceptions, limited by the Prudential Backstops, make it much more 
challenging for banking entities and Regulators alike to identify 
impermissible or evasive activity.192  In the interest of consistency and 
fairness, the Anti-Evasion Provision should both be reexamined and 
amended to include clear guidelines that will allow banking entities to 
more efficiently protect themselves from administrative action stemming 
from the Anti-Evasion Provision,193 
Such amendments to the Anti-Evasion Provision could be 
modeled after other anti-evasion provisions and safe harbors, such as 
those contained in TILA’s Regulation Z,194 and include a good faith 
provision to account for unintentional noncompliance, thereby reducing 
burdensome administrative action and costs.  Banking entities and 
Regulators both would benefit from these suggested modifications to the 
Anti-Evasion Provision, and the FSOC’s potential intervention195 where 
there was a disagreement amongst the Regulators over how to interpret 
and enforce the Anti-Evasion Provision.  Such an intervention would help 
to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Anti-
Evasion Provision.196  Higher standards and clear criteria for what 
constitutes “evasion”197 will both enhance banking entities’ ability to 
appropriately adhere to the Rule’s requirements and clarify the 
191. GOELZER, supra note 12.
192. Whitehead, supra note 19.
193. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2012) (demonstrating the lack of bright line rules for when,
under the Anti-Evasion Provision, Regulators can bring enforcement action against a banking
entity).  Clearer guidelines are critical to clarify the circumstances under which the Regulators
may bring enforcement action against a banking entity for any violations of the Rule as they
relate to proprietary trading or covered funds.  Id.
194. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R § 226 (2016); MAYER ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
195. Supra Part IV.
196. Supra Part IV.
197. Supra Part III.
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Regulators’ enforcement efforts, rendering the Rule’s implementation 
much more effective. 
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